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THE EFFICIENCY AND THE EFFICACY OF TITLE VII
RICHARD A. POSNERt
In a recent article in this journal,' John Donohue argues that Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which forbids employment
discrimination on racial and other invidious grounds,3 may well be an
efficient intervention in labor markets, even if efficiency is narrowly
defined as maximizing social wealth. His argument is of considerable
interest. Social welfare legislation, notably including legislation
designed to help minority groups, is usually thought to involve a trade-
off between equity and efficiency, or between the just distribution of
society's wealth and the aggregate amount of that wealth. If Donohue
is right and equity and efficiency line up on the same side of the issue,
these laws are considerably less problematic than they have seemed to
some observers.
Donohue's argument builds on Gary Becker's theory of racial dis-
crimination.4 For Becker, discrimination by whites against blacks is the
result of an aversion that whites have to associating with blacks.5 This
aversion makes it more costly for whites to transact with blacks than
with other whites. Becker likens this additional transaction cost to
transportation costs in international trade.' The higher those transpor-
tation costs are, the less international trade there will be. Countries
such as Switzerland that are highly dependent on such trade because
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1 Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
3 Donohue confines his attention to racial discrimination, as will I. Title VII also
forbids discrimination on grounds of sex, religion, and national origin. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1982).
4 See generally G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
For a brief summary of Becker's theory, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 27.1 (3d ed. 1986).
5 See G. BECKER, supra note 4, at 14, 153-54.
e Id. at 21 n.3.
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their internal markets are small will suffer more than countries that, by
virtue of the large size of their internal markets,7 are more nearly self-
sufficient. Similarly, blacks will be hurt more than whites by the
whites' aversion to associations with them because the white community
is more nearly self-sufficient than the black.8
Just as there are potential gains from measures that lower trans-
portation costs, so there are potential gains from measures that lower
the costs of association between whites and blacks. One of these meas-
ures is competition. White employers who are not averse to such as-
sociations will have lower labor costs and will therefore tend to gain a
competitive advantage over their bigoted competitors. Hence competi-
tion should, over time, erode the effects of discrimination, not by chang-
ing preferences, to be sure, but by shifting productive resources to firms
that are not handicapped by an aversion to associating with blacks.
Donohue's argument is simply that this process can be accelerated
by a law against employment discrimination, such as Title VII.9 By
adding a legal penalty to the market penalty for discrimination, Title
VII accelerates the movement toward the day when discrimination has
been squeezed out of markets and the gains from trade have thereby
been maximized.'0 In his analysis, Title VII is like an innovation that
reduces the costs of transportation-to zero."
The obvious objection to Donohue's argument is that he has failed
to balance the costs of administering Title VII against the gains from
lowering the costs of transacting between blacks and whites. In the year
ending June 30, 1986, more than 9,000 suits charging employment dis-
crimination, the vast majority under Title VII, were brought in federal
court.' 2 The aggregate costs of these cases, and of the many more mat-
ters that are settled without litigation, must be considerable. However,
I want to emphasize two more subtle points. The first is that, to the
extent it is effective, Title VII may generate substantial costs over and
above the costs of administering the statute, The second point is that
Title VII may not be effective, in which event its administrative costs
are a dead weight loss.
' The size of the market should not be confused with the size of the country. The
larger a country is, all other things being equal, the greater will be transportation costs
in its national markets.
8 See G. BECKER, supra note 4, at 22-24.
9 See Donohue, supra note 1, at 1426.
10 See id.
n See id. at 1426-27.
12 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS app. I, table C 2 (U.S. Government Printing Office
pub. 1986).
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A. The Efficiency of Title VII
An analogy in the international-trade sphere to Donohue's argu-
ment would be to advocate passage of a law requiring a nation's indus-
tries to increase their exports and imports. Such a law would increase
the amount of the nation's international trade, but not by lowering the
cost of transportation. It might bring the nation to a level of interna-
tional trade that it would not otherwise have reached for another fifty
years through falling costs of transportation, but there would be no
gain in efficiency because those costs had not yet fallen.
In Becker's analysis, the costs to whites of associating with blacks
are real costs, and a law requiring such associations does not, at least in
any obvious way, reduce those costs.1 3 Of course, it makes blacks better
off, but presumably by less than it makes whites worse off; for if both
whites and blacks were made better off, there would be net gains from
association and the law would not be necessary.
Another analogy to international trade may help to clarify my dis-
agreement with Donohue's argument. Consider a law that requires the
international maritime industry to adopt a newly developed, more effi-
cient technology; and suppose someone has just invented a type of hull
design that enables a ship to sail faster on less fuel. If adopted, the
design would lower the costs of international transportation. Donohue's
argument implies that a law requiring the adoption of the new technol-
ogy as soon as possible would increase economic welfare by accelerating
attainment of the new, more efficient equilibrium made possible by the
invention. The difficulty is that such a law is likely to distort the opti-
mal path to the new equilibrium. It is rarely efficient to scrap an ex-
isting technology the minute a superior one is developed. We usually
leave it to competition to determine the rate at which the new displaces
the old.
The basic difficulty with Donohue's analysis should now be plain.
He argues for the efficiency of government intervention in a market not
marked by externalities, monopoly or monopsony, high costs of infor-
mation, or any other condition that might justify such intervention on
economic grounds.14 It might of course be the case that the labor mar-
"3 See G. BECKER, supra note 4, at 153-54. Indeed, Becker argues that forced
association between whites and blacks may increase the whites' aversion to blacks and
thereby increase the amount of discrimination, but nothing in my analysis depends on
the correctness of this argument.
14 For discussions of how monopsony might affect the economic analysis of dis-
crimination in labor markets, see Culp, Federal Courts and the Enforcement of Title
VII, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 355 (1986) (Papers & Proceedings); Fischel & Lazear, Com-
parable Worth and Discrimination in Labor Markets, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 891
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kets likely to be affected by Title VII had one or more of these condi-
tions but that is not his argument.15 It might equally be the case that
the costs to whites of being forced to associate with blacks are morally
unworthy of consideration in the formulation of public policy. Stated
differently, it might be that a tax on those whites for the benefit of
blacks would be justifiable on grounds of social equity. But that would
not be an efficiency justification in the wealth-maximization sense that
Donohue employs.
Moreover, it is not altogether plain that a reluctance by white em-
ployers to employ blacks at the same wage as whites (an essential qual-
ification, as we shall see) must reflect nothing more than an inexplica-
ble aversion, whether by the employer itself or by its white employees,
to associating with blacks. Suppose that, because of past exclusion of
blacks from equal educational opportunities or for other reasons, the
average black worker is less productive than the average white, and
suppose further that it is costly for an employer to determine whether
an individual worker deviates from the average for the worker's group.
Then an unprejudiced employer might nonetheless decide to pay blacks
less than whites. This would be unfair to blacks who were in fact above
average, yet might still be an efficient method (in the presence of high
information costs) of compensating black workers." If Title VII comes
along and forbids this method of classifying workers, as it assuredly
does, then the employer will either incur additional information costs
or, by lumping all workers together regardless of productivity, depart
even further from the optimum wage, which is the wage equal to a
worker's marginal product. Either way, efficiency will be reduced.
Again, gains in social equity may trump losses in efficiency. But Dono-
hue is not concerned, at least in the article under discussion, with
equity.
B. The Efficacy of Title VII
I have assumed thus far, as does Donohue, that Title VII is effec-
tive-that it improves the employment prospects of black people. If it
(1986); Holzhauer, The Economic Possibilities of Comparable Worth, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919 (1986).
" See Donohue, supra note 1, at 1414 & n.10.
" See generally Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972) ("A prior discrimination against minorities may be based
on statistical expectations which seem to the employer more cost effective than making
individual determination."). Such discrimination may be socially (as well as privately)
efficient-or may not be, as argued in Lundberg & Startz, Private Discrimination and
Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 340 (1983);
Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228 (1986).
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does not, then its administrative costs yield no gains, either in efficiency
or in equity. One's intuition is that a law, which imposes sanctions on
employers who discriminate and which is enforceable not only by a
federal agency (the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) but
by the victims of discrimination in private suits, must improve the em-
ployment opportunities of members of a group that, at the time the law
was passed, was a frequent target of employment discrimination. But
this may be incorrect, as Professor Landes showed many years ago in a
study of state fair employment practices laws, the precursors of Title
VII.17 Suppose that, for whatever reason, the market wage rate of
blacks is lower than that of whites. Title VII forbids the use of race as
a ground for pay differentials. Because this part of the law is difficult
to evade, and because (as I mentioned earlier) employers find it diffi-
cult to measure the marginal product of the individual worker, we can
assume that blacks and whites will be paid the same wage by the same
employer for the same job. This means, however, that the employer
will be paying some or many of its black workers more than their mar-
ginal product. 8 The employer will therefore have an economic incen-
tive to employ fewer blacks. The law also forbids making hiring or
firing decisions on the basis of race, but this part of the law is very
difficult to enforce. To see this, however, it is necessary to get more
deeply into the structure of the law than Donohue attempts to do in his
article.
There are two basic approaches that plaintiffs can use to make out
a case under Title VII. 9 The first, the "disparate treatment" approach,
requires proving intentional discrimination."0 This turns out to be ex-
ceptionally difficult in practice. No employer of even moderate sophisti-
cation will admit or leave a paper record showing that it has refused to
17 See Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 507,
544-45 & n.32 (1968) (observing that gains in black wages were partially offset by
increased unemployment among blacks).
'8 The employer cannot simply reduce the white workers' wages to the level of the
black workers because then the white workers would receive less than their market
wage and therefore would go elsewhere. Of course, if all or most employers are affected
by the law, the white workers' market wage may fall. But it would not fall all the way
to the level of the black workers.
" For a brief summary of the elaborate body of legal doctrines that has evolved in
the interpretation and application of Title VII, see PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, IN A NUTSHELL, pt. 5 (2d ed. 1981). For fuller treat-
ments, see S. AGID, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION: PROVING AND DEFENDING A
TITLE VII CASE (2d ed. 1979); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL
STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1982).
20 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (ad-
dressing the issue of an employer's intent when an individual claims disparate treat-
ment); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (same).
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hire, or has fired, a worker because of the worker's race. In the absence
of such evidence, the worker may try to eliminate alternative explana-
tions, but this usually is impossible. There are, it is true, some workers
who are so superior that no cause other than racial animus could ex-
plain a refusal to hire them or a decision to fire them. But even a
bigoted employer is unlikely to take out his racial animus against a
perfect worker. Most workers are not perfect. As to them, it is usually
easy to supply a plausible reason why they were not hired or why they
were let go. The plaintiff may try to rebut the reason by showing an
overall pattern of racial hiring or firing, but this type of proof is expen-
sive and will rarely be cost-justified when all the plaintiff is seeking is
reinstatement or back pay, the most common remedies (along with at-
torney's fees) under Title VII.21 Common law damages (including pu-
nitive damages) are not available in Title VII cases, and there is no
right to trial by jury.22
Occasionally, a group of workers will band together in a class ac-
tion," or the EEOC will bring suit against a company or even an in-
dustry on behalf of a large group of workers who have been discrimi-
nated against. But there are few such cases relative to the vast labor
market in the United States,24 and the threat of such a suit may not
have much deterrent effect because the available sanctions are so mild.
The second basic approach under Title VII is the "disparate im-
pact" approach. If a firm uses a screening device such as an aptitude
test or requiring a high-school degree that has the effect of excluding a
disproportionate number of blacks, the device is unlawful unless the
firm can show a strong business justification for it, even if the device is
not intended to keep out blacks.25 The crux of the problem is identify-
ing disproportionate exclusion. The usual solution is to compare the
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (Title VII's remedial provision); see also C.
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARDS, supra note 19, at 69-80 (discussing com-
plexities of statistical proof under Title VII).
2 The Supreme Court has observed that remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
are equitable in nature. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The
courts of appeals have held, therefore, that there is no right to a jury trial of claims
brought under Title VII alone. See, e.g., Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817
F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1987). The logic of Albemarle has also persuaded courts of appeals
that punitive damages are unavailable under Title VII, as well as common law com-
pensatory damages (as distinct from backpay). See, e.g., Protos v. Volkswagen of
America, 797 F.2d 129, 138 (3d Cir. 1986); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir.
1977).
2 See Frans v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co.,
422 U.S. 405.
"' Eighty-two class action suits involving employment discrimination were filed in
1985. Telephone interview with David Cook, Chief of the Statistics Division of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Oct. 13, 1987).
" See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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percentage of blacks employed by the firm with the percentage in the
labor pool from which the firm draws. This method of proof makes it
more costly for a firm to operate in an area where the labor pool con-
tains a high percentage of blacks, by enlarging the firm's legal expo-
sure. 6 Therefore, when deciding where to locate a new plant or where
to expand an existing one, a firm will be attracted (other things being
equal) to areas that have only small percentages of blacks in their labor
pools.
217
This incentive exists even if the firm is not worried about dispa-
rate-impact suits. Title VII makes it more costly to employ black work-
ers; it also makes it more costly to fire them because the firm may have
to incur the expense of defending a Title VII disparate-treatment suit
when a black employee is discharged. These costs operate as a tax on
employing black workers and give firms an incentive to locate in areas
with few blacks.
Thus Title VII can be expected to have several effects: to increase
the wages of those blacks who are employed by wiping out racial pay
differentials; to eliminate some discrimination in hiring and firing; but,
in the case of some employers, to reduce the number of blacks who are
employed. 8 When the wages of black workers are averaged over all
blacks, both those who are employed and those who are not, the aver-
age black wage may not have increased (or increased much) as a result
of Title VII, and may even have decreased. Any net loss of wealth
might be offset by a gain in self-esteem from being freed from direct
(though not, if the foregoing analysis is correct, indirect) racial discrim-
ination, but that gain would be outside the scope of the analyses that
Donohue and I are making.
Professor Landes, in his study of state fair employment laws,
found that the employment and wage effects partially offset each
other.29 Unfortunately, it is difficult to make a parallel study of Title
VII. Since Title VII is applicable nationwide, cross-sectional studies
are not possible. Time studies are confounded by the number of other
26 See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RIcHARDS, supra note 19, at 46-51.
27 In a recent case, evidence was presented that the defendant "desire[d to]...
build its plant in a city with a minority population no greater than 35% of the total
population, allegedly because it had previously experienced difficulty meeting affirma-
tive action goals in communities with proportionately larger minority populations."
Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986). I am
indebted to Professor Donohue for bringing this case to my attention.
28 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
29 See Landes, supra note 17, at 544-45 (finding, in fair employment states be-
tween 1939 and 1959, that "the increase in the ratio of non-white to white male wages
was partly at the expense of greater unemployment differentials between non-whites
and whites.").
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developments affecting the wages and employment of blacks since Title
VII was enacted in 1964, including changes in welfare benefits (which
may affect the incentive to seek employment), changes in the taste for
discrimination (besides any such change attributable to Title VII itself),
expanded educational opportunities for blacks, the disintegration of the
lower-class black family, the shift in jobs from the industrial to the
service (including governmental) sector, the increased political clout of
blacks, the decline of unions, and a variety of other changes. Disentan-
gling the effects of Title VII from all the other things that have been
going on since 1964 and that bear on the wages and employment of
blacks seems well-nigh impossible. Even disentangling the effects of all
governmental programs to combat racial discrimination from the effects
of other developments is extraordinarily difficult and thus far inconclu-
sive, as shown in a recent and very scrupulous review essay by James
Heckman.30 Although some studies find that Title VII has increased
both the wages and employment of blacks, and others that the wage
and employment effects have cancelled each other out,3" the most re-
sponsible conclusion for the nonspecialist appears to be that the effects
of Title VII are unknown.
Of course, Title VII could have indirect effects as well as the di-
rect effects that I have been emphasizing. By putting the government's
moral authority behind efforts to eradicate racial discrimination, Title
VII may have reduced the aversion of whites to associating with blacks
and may have helped blacks overcome the psychological legacy of slav-
ery. As Heckman shows, however, when such indicia of black progress
as relative incomes of black and white workers and black and white
families, and the rate at which black versus white workers drop out of
the labor force before they reach retirement age, are taken into account,
one observes not only that black progress has been distinctly uneven,
but also that it is not well correlated with Title VII or any other gov-
ernment initiative. Moreover, both the decrease in overt expressions of
hostility toward blacks, and the existence of anti-discrimination laws
themselves, may reflect the growing political influence and assertiveness
3' See J. Heckman, The Impact of Government on the Economic Status of Black
Americans (rev. May 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
31 Compare Leonard, Antidiscrimination or Reverse Discrimination: The Impact
of Changing Demographics, Title VII, and Affirmative Action on Productivity, 19 J.
HUMAN RES. 145 (1984) (arguing that Title VII has played a significant role in in-
creasing black employment) with Belier, The Economics of Enforcement of an Antidis-
crimination Law: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 359
(1978) (arguing that Title VII has not served as an efficient means of increasing the
overall wealth of blacks).
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of black people and the growing racial tolerance of white people, rather
than show that the laws have caused greater tolerance.
To conclude, I am not persuaded by Donohue's argument that Ti-
tle VII can be defended on strictly economic grounds, as overcoming the
transaction-cost barrier to market interactions between white and black
people that Gary Becker identified in his economic study of racial dis-
crimination. Title VII, to the extent effective, ignores, rather than
reduces, the costs of undesired associations between whites and blacks.
It may be correct on moral grounds to do so, but that is not Donohue's
argument. Furthermore, it is an open question whether Title VII has
improved the net welfare of black people, directly or indirectly. If it has
not, then the costs of administering the law are a dead weight social
loss that cannot be justified on grounds of social equity.

